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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does 





KRAUSE, Circuit Judge. 
Appellant Conor Corcoran filed an adversary proceeding in Bankruptcy Court 
seeking a determination that defamation damages imposed by the Pennsylvania Court of 
Common Pleas (“CCP”) against Chapter 13 debtor Brian McCabe were not dischargeable 
under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6)’s exception for debts arising from “willful and malicious 
injury.”  At trial, the Bankruptcy Court determined that this exception did not apply and 
the District Court affirmed.  Because Corcoran has not established that McCabe inflicted 
a “willful and malicious injury” within the meaning of § 523(a)(6), we will affirm.   
 
I. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
 
The District Court had jurisdiction to review the Bankruptcy Court’s final order 
under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1).  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d) and 1291.  
“We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s appellate review of the Bankruptcy 
Court’s decision and exercise the same standard of review as the District Court in 
reviewing the Bankruptcy Court’s determinations.”  In re Miller, 730 F.3d 198, 203 (3d 




A debt is not dischargeable under § 523(a)(6) of the Bankruptcy Code if it results 




purposefully inflicted the injury or acted with substantial certainty that injury would 
result.”  In re Conte, 33 F. 3d 303, 305 (3d Cir. 1994).  We construe this exception 
“liberally . . . in favor of debtors,” In re Cohn, 54 F.3d 1108, 1113 (3d Cir. 1995), and 
Corcoran must establish that it applies “by a preponderance of the evidence,” id. at 1114 
(citing Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 287-88 (1991)).   
The Bankruptcy Court determined that Corcoran did not meet this burden because he 
provided only circumstantial evidence that McCabe posted the defamatory message at 
issue and no evidence that McCabe acted willfully and maliciously.  Corcoran does not 
challenge this determination on appeal, but rather urges that the CCP’s finding of willful 
and malicious injury should be given preclusive effect.   
But as the District Court correctly concluded, “[n]either the default judgment, nor the 
punitive damages award, included a finding that McCabe inflicted a ‘willful and 
malicious injury’ within the meaning of § 523(a)(6).”  J.A. 8.  The CCP’s default 
judgment as to liability is not entitled to preclusive effect because it “lacks the requisite 
element that it be actually litigated.”  McGill v. Southwark Realty Co., 828 A.2d 430, 435 
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).1  The CCP’s imposition of punitive damages is not dispositive 
because, under Pennsylvania law, punitive damages may be awarded in a defamation case 
on a finding of either recklessness or knowledge of the statement’s falseness.  See Joseph 
v. Scranton Times L.P., 129 A.3d 404, 430, 437 (Pa. 2015).  The CCP’s damages opinion 
 
1 The CCP ruled based on Pennsylvania law, so Pennsylvania law governs the preclusive 
effect of that ruling.  See Paramount Aviation Corp. v. Agusta, 178 F.3d 132, 145 (3d Cir. 




is also not dispositive because, while the CCP determined that McCabe was “fully 
apprised” of the statement’s falseness when he published it, we have held that “act[ing] 
deliberately with knowledge of a high degree of probability” that harm will occur is “less 
than substantial certainty” as required under § 523(a)(6).  Conte, 33 F.3d at 307.  Because 
the issue the CCP decided is not “identical with the one presented” here, collateral 
estoppel does not apply.  Safeguard Mut. Ins. Co. v. Williams, 345 A.2d 664, 668 (Pa. 
1975).   
Corcoran also argues that the Bankruptcy Court erred by not admitting a copy of the 
damages hearing transcript into evidence.  The Bankruptcy Court concluded that the 
transcript was inadmissible, and the District Court agreed.  But we need not reach that 
issue because the transcript contains no finding of willful and malicious injury either.  
The Bankruptcy Court “reviewed the Statements [in the transcript] and concluded that 
none of them could possibly be construed as an admission that [McCabe] posted the 
Defamatory Message, much less that [he] intended to cause a willful and malicious 
injury.”  J.A. 93.  We agree.  Even if we disagreed with the Bankruptcy Court’s ruling, 
because the Bankruptcy Court’s decision not to admit the transcript did not “affect the 
outcome of the case,” it was at most harmless error.  GN Netcom, Inc. v. Plantronics, 




For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
